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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
William G. Morgan*
Search and Seizure: Voluntary Consent Distinguished from Submission to
Lawfully Constituted Authority- In United States v. Wa ler, 108 F. Supp.
450 (N.D. Ill. 1952), defendant sought to suppress certain evidence con-
sisting of marihuana and marked currency, on the ground they were procured
by an unconstitutional search and seizure. Durkin, an enforcement officer
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, arranged for Medley, a special employee
of the same Bureau, to purchase marihuana from defendant with marked
currency. After the purchase both Medley and Durkin returned to the
apartment and were admitted by a person other than the defendant. Finding
Waller, Durkin told him he was a federal agent, then asked him if he had
sold narcotics to Medley, whether there were any other narcotics in the
apartment, and whether certain currency was the same used by Medley to
make the purchase. Defendant responded affirmatively to these questions,
after which the agent "looked around the apartment" for some 20 or 30
minutes, then took the evidence and defendant to his office.
Rejecting the government's contention that the search was incidental to
a valid arrest, the court went on to consider the question of whether de-
fendant's conduct was a peaceful submission to a lawfully constituted author-
ity, or whether the conduct indicated a voluntary consent on the part of the
defendant. [A person may consent to search without a warrant. The con-
stitutional rights as to searches and seizures may be waived. Zap v. United
States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946).]
The court held the facts here indicated voluntary consent. The federal
agent was not a trespasser. He had used no force to gain admittance to the
apartment, and the defendant himself had raised no objection to the agent's
entry. The inquiries made by the agent were not accompanied by any threat
or force. The defendant not only responded to the questions, but also by
affirmative action pointed out the specific location of additional contraband
marihuana, which he might well have concealed. Such action constitutes
voluntary consent and does not require the suppression of evidence so
obtained.
Entrapment and the Use of Decoys-In United States v. Lemons, 200 F.2d
396 (7th Cir. 1952), defendant relied upon the defense of entrapment as a
grounds for reversing his conviction. Gales, a Federal Narcotics Agent, posed
as a frequenter of the apartment of "Momma" Thomas, and saw defendant
pass a package to her and use language indicating it contained narcotics.
Gales thereafter was introduced to the defendant, and arranged for a delivery
of two ounces of heroin to himself. On delivery the arrest was made.
The general proposition is well established that decoys may be used to
present an opportunity to one intending and willing to commit crime, but
the use of decoys is not permissible to ensnare the innocent and law-abiding
into the commission of crime. When the criminal design originates, not
with the accused, but in the mind of government officers, and the accused
is lured by persuasion, deceitful representation, or inducement into the
commission of a criminal act, then the government is estopped by sound
public policy from prosecuting the one who commits it.
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In the present case, defendant protested he obtained heroin for "Mamma"
Thomas only as a favor to her, and prior to the inducement of the Federal
officer had never trafficked in narcotics for profit. However, his general
familiarity with the jargon of narcotics traders, the generally incredible
story of how the narcotics were obtained, plus the positive proof offered by
the government, was sufficient to sustain his conviction.
For other recent cases see Lunsford v. United States, 200 F.2d 237 (10th
Cir. 1952) ; Johnson v. State, 61 So.2d 867 (Ct. App. Ala. 1952).
When is a Crime Committed "in the Presence" of an Officer Justifying
Search Without a Warrant-In Griffin v. State, 92 A.2d 743 (Md. 1952), a
police officer, by looking through a window, saw defendant and several other
men, and also "a pad of slips and a conventional lottery book open on a
table". The officer entered without having obtained a warrant, arrested
defendant, and searched the house finding various gambling paraphernalia.
On trial for the violation of statutes prohibiting lotteries and gambling, de-
fendant objected to the admission into evidence of the gambling equipment,
claiming the search to have been illegal.
The court construed the Maryland statute as giving immunity only from
unreasonable search and seizure, and went on to the question of when a police
officer may enter and search for evidence without a warrant. Mere belief
that an article sought by law enforcement officers is concealed in a private
dwelling furnishes no justification for a search, even though the facts show
probable cause. But when a crime is committed "in the presence or view"
of an officer, a search without a warrant is justified. A crime is considered
as being committed "in the presence or view" of an officer when any of his
senses afford him knowledge that it is being comhmitted. Thus, knowledge of
a crime may be acquired through a sense of smell [Cope v. State, 157 Tenn.
199, 7 S.W.2d 805 (1928), where officers observed a light in room of defend-
ant's home, and could see figures walking near the light, and there was a
strong smell from the cooking of mash and whiskey. Although the curtains
were drawn, the officers entered and discovered a still. Search without
warrant held justified] ; or sound [Hawkins v. Lutton, 95 Wis. 492, 70 N.W.
483 (1897) ; officer searched after hearing a disturbance in a home]. In the
present case, it was considered immaterial that the officer could not read any
of the notations in the book or on the slips before entering the house. An
officer charged with the duty of enforcing the gambling laws, can view
circumstances in the light of his special experience in deciding whether a
law is being violated in his presence.
Government Liability under Federal Tort Claims Act for Alleged Negligence
of Federal Officer-In United States v. Folk, 199 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1952),
actions were instituted under the Federal Tort Claims Act [28 U.S.C. §§1346,
2671 et. seq. (Supp. 1952) ] to recover (1) for the death and (2) for the pain
and suffering of one Hammond as a result of a wound from a bullet acci-
dentally discharged from the pistol of an agent of the Federal Alcohol Tax
Unit while the agent was in the performance of his official duties of parti-
cipating in a raid upon an illicit distillery. The federal agent, Cecil, with
South Carolina State constables, had surprised Hammond and three others
at the distillery site. Though warned not to do so, all immediately started
running away. When Cecil started running after Hammond he took the
safety off his loaded automatic pistol while continuing to hold it cocked
in his hand. While jumping a ditch, the pistol accidentally discharged, and
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unknown to the officer, severed an artery in Hammond's arm. Cecil lost
track of Hammond, though he continued the search for about five minutes.
The next day Hammond's body was found about 110 yards from the place
where Cecil had stopped in his pursuit. Blood was also found on several
trees near where Cecil had stopped. The terrain from the distillery site
to where the body of Hammond was found was largely clear, with visibility
almost unhampered.
Reversing the district court, it was held that the circumstances did not
warrant a finding of negligence as to the agent's conduct. Under both state
and federal decisions the measure of care owed to Hammond was no higher
than that owed to a mere trespasser, for he had been caught in the act of
committing a federal crime and it was the agent's duty to make every rea-
sonable effort to arrest him. It was not negligence to pursue Hammond with gun
in hand and the safety catch off, for there was no telling what course of con-
duct Hammond might adopt. ["There must not be too strict a limitation on
what a federal officer should do in carrying out a dangerous duty imposed on
him by virtue of his office."] There was no reason why Cecil should have fore-
seen the consequences of possible injury in his handling of the gun, especially
because of the high improbability that an accidental discharge would hit a
rapidly moving target. Nor was there negligence in failing to make a more
extended search, as the agent had no knowledge at the time that he had
wounded Hammond.
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